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Abstract 
Stabilising global greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at levels to avoid significant 
climate risks will require massive ‘decarbonisation’ over the next few decades. Achieving 
the necessary scale of emissions reductions will require well-thought out strategies and a 
multifaceted policy effort to support a broad array of technological and behavioural 
changes. This paper outlines some core principles for guiding the design of clean 
technology policies, with a focus on energy.  
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Introduction 
The first principle for guiding the design of clean 
technology policies is not to pick technology 
winners, but rather to pick winning technology 
policies. Many studies analyse the technological 
options for achieving deep reductions in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Economists who model 
climate policies, on the other hand, tend to focus on 
cost-effective solutions, but often with less 
technological detail. All models have difficulties in 
incorporating realistic representations of 
technological change, uncertainties, barriers and 
non-market-based policies. Energy projections are 
difficult for proven technologies, and even trickier 
for emerging ones.  
We are not sure what magnitude of emissions 
reductions will ultimately be needed or what the 
corresponding prices will be, and do not necessarily 
have a good idea of the costs of large-scale 
deployment of existing technologies. Breakthrough 
technologies might arrive, and the costs and quality 
of existing technologies could be improved. How to 
choose among technologies? On the one hand, 
policies should be as neutral as possible, to allow a 
broad range of technologies to emerge and compete, 
and to avoid the problem of governments 
attempting to pick winners. On the other hand, we 
cannot be fully neutral, given that we are largely 
aware of the major technological options that will be 
available over the coming decades and some 
technologies have specific barriers and potentials 
that may require targeted assistance. 
A second, related principle is thus for policies to 
address market and regulatory barriers. In the case 
of market failures, private actors do not reap the full 
social benefits or costs of their actions. By correcting 
these market failures and ‘getting the prices right’, 
policies can better align private incentives with the 
public interest. In the following pages, we discuss a 
variety of market failures and related barriers for 
clean energy technologies. 
Carbon pricing is a technology policy 
The core of any cost-effective approach should be a 
strong price signal across the entire economy that 
carbon emissions are costly. This price signal should 
be increasing over time since a climate policy could 
involve a budget on allowable GHG emissions, and 
increasing scarcity of allowable emissions is usually 
characterised by rising prices. Emissions pricing can 
be implemented either through a carbon tax or a 
broad-based cap-and-trade system. The reason for a 
primary reliance on carbon pricing is two-fold. 
First, technologies are only useful if people want to 
use them. Carbon pricing makes clean technologies 
more cost-competitive and provides ‘market pull’ by 
encouraging their adoption. It also reduces some of 
the need for reliance on public innovation 
programmes targeted specifically towards clean 
energy, as the market has more incentive to 
contribute. 
Second, many options are available for reducing 
emissions. No command-and-control regulation 
could efficiently prescribe all the appropriate 
activities that should be undertaken. Carbon pricing, 
on the other hand, creates incentives to do all these 
things: use less carbon-intensive fuels and products, 
conserve energy and develop and deploy emissions-
reducing technologies.  
Technological change and turnover will be essential 
for deep reductions; however, a lack of emissions 
pricing is not the only roadblock. There are a host of 
other impediments to a robust market for clean-
technology research, development and demon-
stration (RD&D): financial, regulatory, behavioural, 
and network barriers; knowledge and innovation 
spillovers; and scale economies, among other 
challenges. Moreover, political realities may 
constrain the carbon price from being high enough 
to induce the necessary transformation and 
innovation. A carbon price should be supported by 
complementary policies to address barriers to 
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Remove distorting policies 
Distorting subsidies for fossil-based energy should 
be removed. In non-OECD countries, subsidies are 
primarily used to keep consumer prices artificially 
low, resulting in overconsumption. In OECD 
countries, by contrast, most of these subsidies are for 
fossil-fuel production. Of course, beneficiaries of 
subsidies will resist reform. Therefore, removing 
subsidies may require a gradual phasing-out. 
Another kind of indirect subsidy is inefficient 
regulation to reflect the cost of other environmental 
damages, such as conventional air and water 
pollutants, often related to GHG emissions through 
common activities or sources. Inefficient regulation 
of GHG-related emissions can impede technical 
progress. Efficient regulation will also help improve 
market signals and make clean-energy sources 
relatively more competitive compared to their fossil-
fuel counterparts. 
Reward the social value of innovation.  
The social value of research and innovation often 
surpasses what the innovators themselves can 
appropriate. These knowledge ‘spillovers’ represent 
a kind of market failure, because by receiving only a 
fraction of the benefits, innovators have only a 
fraction of the incentive to engage in RD&D. Studies 
of commercial innovations suggest that, on average, 
less than one-half of the gains from RD&D return to 
the originator, although appropriation rates vary 
considerably over different types of innovations. 
Basic research, in particular, is an excellent 
candidate for government support, as the 
commercial applications are often distant and 
unknown. The appropriation rates for climate-
friendly technologies are likely to be relatively low, 
at least initially, and rising over time, which means 
that some extra support during the transition can 
help clean-technology development. 
Promoting learning by doing  
A sizeable learning effect, by which costs fall as 
experience and cumulative production grow over 
time, is another form of innovation that the market 
alone may insufficiently reward. One reason may 
again be spillovers—if techniques can be replicated, 
later competitors can enjoy the benefits of the 
experience of the early movers without shouldering 
their higher costs. In promoting learning, a key 
question is the degree to which one should 
differentiate among technologies. Learning rates are, 
however, likely to differ among emerging 
technologies and are difficult to predict. 
Nevertheless, significant cost-saving potentials may 
exist. 
Other barriers may require more specific 
attention 
Information. For markets to function, they require not 
only good property rights and competition, but also 
appropriate information. Improving the availability 
of information can allow better consumer and firm 
decision-making at lower costs. Information barriers 
may also arise between the public and private 
sectors. Private actors have better information about 
their own costs and potentials, and may have 
different perceptions about policies and prices than 
policy-makers. These asymmetries impede the 
design of efficient strategies for both stakeholder 
groups. As such, a negotiated agreement may be 
considered, e.g. in a case with shared uncertainty 
about future abatement costs between the regulator 
and business. 
Standards.  Still, perfect information may not be 
enough. Consumer uncertainty about energy prices 
and the quality and reliability of new technologies 
being offered can contribute to seemingly myopic 
behaviour. Poor choices can also arise when those 
making decisions about energy-using appliances 
and building features are not the same people as 
those using or paying for the energy. Coping with 
short payback horizons and different incentives for 
investors and users can require product-specific 
interventions, such as building codes and standards 
for energy efficiency and fuel economy. 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs). IPRs can provide an 
important vehicle for enabling innovators to gain 
financial returns on their investments. On the other 
hand, poorly designed and enforced IPRs can create 
obstacles to diffusion. In case of producer firms, 
weak protection of IPRs adds to the hesitation in 
transferring to or sharing technology with other 
firms, which may slow down the overall process not 
only of diffusion but also of advancement of the 
technological frontier.  
Financing. Risk and payback horizons also influence 
investment decisions. If the private perceptions of 
these factors do not align with those of the public, 
then policies may be needed to assist financing and 
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Technologies for which capital costs are very large 
are more likely to need preferential financing or 
guarantees to reduce private investment risks. 
Developing country challenges. In developing countries 
the finance sector is particularly hesitant in 
supporting projects with new and climate-friendly 
technologies on account of their lack of capability to 
assess financial viability and their excessive reliance 
on the balance-sheet as a criterion of credit 
worthiness of project owners. 
Some barriers are more closely linked to 
certain technologies 
Scale economies. Economies of scale are an issue for 
many new technologies, causing high production 
costs for the first units. Policies to address this 
barrier can legitimately help some new technologies 
gain acceptance and get off the ground, but they 
s h o u l d  b e  c a r e f u l  t o  a v o i d  e x t e n d e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  
uneconomic technologies. An example of a policy to 
address this barrier is the hybrid vehicle tax credit in 
the United States, which phases out after a certain 
number of models are sold.  
Networks and infrastructure. Some technological 
options require new infrastructure and support 
networks in order to function. However, private 
actors are reluctant to take on activities that supply 
p u b l i c  g o o d s ,  a n d  m o s t  w o u l d  p r e f e r  t o  w a i t  f o r  
someone else to do it. The resulting network 
externalities are an important cause of ‘technological 
lock-in’, and public intervention may be required to 
change paths. 
Tradeoffs. Many technologies that reduce GHGs may 
instead cause other environmental damages and 
risks, such as nuclear generation, which creates 
radioactive waste and security concerns. Public 
assessment of the tradeoffs is needed before 
allowing broad deployment. 
Certain technologies may deserve 
preferential treatment 
In addition to addressing important market failures 
and barriers, policy-makers may want to direct extra 
attention and support to certain kinds of 
technologies that have special potential. Some 
examples of especially desirable technologies are 
those that expand options and reduce costs of 
reaching deep GHG emissions reductions (‘backstop 
technologies’), i.e. those that may have additional 
spillover benefits at home, and those that may have 
spillover benefits abroad, further reducing global 
emissions and improving the likelihood of more 
globally stringent GHG agreements. 
Countries may have national RD&D deployment 
policies, but the development of new technologies is 
a global effort. Consequently, there may be 
opportunities for coordination (or free-riding, for 
that matter) and for specialisation. Technology-
oriented agreements can be aimed at knowledge-
sharing and coordination, research, development or 
demonstration, and even deployment. Due to 
differences in national skills and opportunities 
(comparative advantages), the large investments 
needed with uncertain payback, and positive 
spillover effects, international coordination and even 
collaboration makes sense. 
Policy interactions 
Policy-makers have enacted a variety of measures 
both to reduce emissions and to promote alternative 
energy sources. However, more policies do not 
always mean better outcomes, or more clean-energy 
technologies. In particular, when additional policies 
to promote renewable energy overlap with tradable 
quota mechanisms, the clean-energy policies can 
instead benefit the dirty sources. 
Summary and options 
Not all barriers to adoption of emerging 
technologies are market failures. Cost, reliability and 
quality issues, and risk are all legitimate aspects that 
the market should be allowed to weigh in. As a 
result, the main tools for encouraging climate-
friendly technologies should be those that encourage 
the market to make good choices more generally: 
pricing carbon emissions and other environmental 
damages, removing distorting subsidies and barriers 
to competition and supporting RD&D broadly. 
Broad-based policies include RD&D tax credits, 
funding universities and research institutions, and 
other public support for research through 
competitive grant processes. 
Some technologies face particular barriers, requiring 
society to make a decision of whether to support 
them, committing to major infrastructure 
investments or environmental risks. Other 
technologies may merit extra support, because they 
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reductions, or because they have greater potential 
for being adopted in other parts of the world. 
More specific policies are required to address 
particular market failures and barriers, including 
information requirements, energy-efficiency 
standards, building codes, and the like. In these 
cases, policies will generally be more effective, the 
more closely they target the specific market failure, 
as opposed to a specific technology. 
International engagement is another component of 
technology policy. Recognising that climate 
mitigation and technological advances are a global 
effort, countries can leverage their own RD&D 
resources with international partnerships and 
agreements to encourage knowledge-sharing and 
broaden the markets for new technologies. 
Ultimately, the biggest driver of technological 
adoption and change will be the mitigation policy, 
which determines the demand for those 
technologies. An additional advantage of emissions-
pricing policies is their ability to generate revenue, 
which can help fund the complementary technology 
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